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Statement of

Donald Regan,
Professor of Law, The University of Michigan
Before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Orrin Hatch,
Chairman, November 17, 1981.

Editor's Note: This excerpt from Professor Regan's testimony
questions the theoretical advisability of amending the Constitution to restrict or prohibit abortion.
This committee is considering proposed amendments to
the Constitution. o one should vote for a constitutional
amendment at any stage of the process as a matter of mere
political expediency.
The question of whether to amend the Constitution should
be treated as a matter of the highest principle. Granting that,
how does one look for a principled answer to the question.
"What should the Constitution say about abortion?" One
possible approach is to consider the abstract question , "What
ould an ideal Constitution for an ideal State say about
abortion?"
I am sure many witnesses before this committee, speaking
on both sides of the issue, have taken essentially that
approach. If I followed them in this, I would produce moral
and philosophical arguments that a fetus should not be
regarded as a person and that a woman should not be made
to bear a child she does not want. If I did this, I would only
repeat what ou have heard before.
There is another way to approach the problem, which is in
some respects a better way. You should be asking, "What
legal position on abortion coheres best with the general
spirit of our laws?" Our laws are a rich fabric, and they
reveal more than any philosophical argument about what
our values really are.
I believe that laws forbidding abortion are inconsistent
with the general spirit of our legal system. Fundamental
principles of American law, principles recognized in the
common law and statutes as well as in parts of the Constitution that no one suggests should be amended , argue strongly
that we should not prohibit abortion.
It is true that we are contemplating changing our laws if
we amend the Constitution; but, still, what is being contemplated is a change in one part of our laws. We do not wish
to change them all , all at once, nor could we do so. We
should therefore be certain before we make a change that
what we propose to add is consistent in spirit with what we
already have and are satisfied with. The proposed amendments on abortion fail that test.
The first issue that arises, on my approach as on a standard approach, is whether the fetus is to be regarded as
a person. In my view, a general consideration of our laws
does not compel an answer to this question either way. I
shall therefore concede for purposes of the following argument that it is permissible to regard the fetus as a person.
I suggest that, even so, laws prohibiting abortion are
inconsistent with the basic tenets of our legal culture. The
reason , simply stated , is this: It is a deeply rooted principle
of our law that, in general , one individual should not be
legally compelled to provide aid to another individual. For
example, a Pennsylvania court recently held that a man
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could not be compelled to give bone marrow to be transplanted into his dying cousin, even though the operation
involved little risk, even though healthy bone marrow regenerates, and even though there was no other source of aid.
We value highly the freedom to choose one's associations
and responsibilities. We do not believe that one individual
should be compelled to serve another. Forbidding abortion is
tantamount to compelling a pregnant woman to serve the
fetus-to give aid and to give aid of a specially personal,
invasive, and ~urdensome sort. Unless there is some reason
to set aside the general principle I have referred to, abortion
should not be forbidden.
There are a number of possible objections to this argument. It might be said, "Abortion is not a mere refusal to aid;
it is an active killing." It might said, "Surely it is not a fundamental principle of our law that individuals may ignore
others in their need and. if it is a principle of our law, it
is time we changed it." It might be said, "We make exceptions to the principle of not compelling aid. Surely laws
against abortion would fall under some such exception."
These objections are mistaken. I shall do what I can in the
limited time available to explain why.
The most troublesome objection is the claim that abortion
is not a mere refusal to aid but an active killing. We normally discuss problems about giving aid in terms of acts and
omissions. That is the way lawyers talk about the problems.
It is omissions that we normally decline to punish. Securing
an abortion seems active and therefore seems to fall on the
wrong side of the traditional distinction for my purposes.
The truth, however, is not that abortion falls on the wrong
side of the traditional distinction; the truth is that abortion
does not fit comfortably on either side. In some respects,
to be sure, abortion looks like an act, but in other respects it
is quite unlike the standard act which we forbid .
In the standard case, when we forbid an act against a
victim-murder, for example-we are forbidding an invasion of the victim's life from outside. The victim's interests
could be completely protected by removing the would-be
actor from the scene entirely. The victim makes no claim on
the actor except that the actor go_away. That is not true in
the abortion context. We cannot serve the fetus 's interests by
removing the woman from the scene. The fetus needs the
woman. The fetus makes a positive claim and a substantial
claim on the woman. The issue is whether the woman
should be free to reject the fetus's claim.
In its basic structure then, the abortion situation is most
like cases-the bone marrow case, for example-where the
issue is whether aid must be provided and where a refusal to
aid is a standard omission. The central issue is whether the
woman may reject the fetus's positive claim. That issue is
much more basic than whether, because of the special features of the case, the woman's refusal to aid must be
accomplished by seemingly active methods.
That brings us to the second question-whether our law
embodies a principle allowing one to refuse aid and, if it

does, whether we should change it. There are a wide range
of cases in which our laws impose essentially trivial duties
of aid-for example, a duty to call a doctor for someone who
is injured . In fact, even cases involving these trivial duties
are clearly treated by courts as exceptions to a general principle that no aid is required.
If I had time, I would argue at length that the pregnant
woman has done less to make herself an appropriate subject
for a duty to aid than any of the other individuals on whom
we are willing to impose these trivial duties. But the first
point which should be emphasized is that in no other case
do we impose duties of aid which involve a physical invasion and physical burdens like those of pregnancy.
I have already mentioned the only decided "duty to aid"
case which at all resembles the abortion case in this
respect-the case which held that a man could not be compelled to give bone marrow to be transplanted into his dying
cousin. The burden that was too great to impose on that
man was much less than the burdens of a normal pregnancy.
We must not close our eyes to the fact that pregnancy is
invasive. It alters the entire functioning of a woman's body.
And it is burdensome. It involves substantial pain, discomfort, and disability spread over many months. Further, many
aspects of our jurisprudence, from the disappearance of
state-imposed corporal punishment to judicial scruples about
organ donation by incompetent persons, show that the imposition of physical invasion and physical pain are special!
disfavored.
It is true that some women accept the burdens of pregnancy willingly, even joyfully, if they want the child they
are carrying, but the proper measure of the burdens for our
purposes is how they appear to women who do not want the
child. The issue is what we may impose on them.
If we want to consider cases involving burdens genuinely
comparable to the burdens of pregnancy, we must consider
hypothetical cases. Would any court punish a parent for not
running into a burning building to rescue his child? I think
not. Would any court order a parent to donate a kidney to
his child? o. Even though these hypothetical cases involve people who intentionall became parents of living
children-in some respects the people most appropriate!
compelled to give aid-I submit that no court \ ould find a
duty in these cases. It follows that a pregnant oman should
have no duty to remain pregnant.
Let me say a few words on a topic I ha e alread mentioned, the range of recognized e ceptions to the principle
that there is no duty to aid. e impose some duties of aid on
lifeguards and innkeepers, on parents and social hosts, on
people who voluntaril begin a process of rescue, and on
people who innocently cause accidents to others. h not
on pregnant women?
All I can do , given the limitations of time, is to sum up in
a series of negative propositions the facts that distinguish the
pregnant woman from all others on horn we impose duties
to aid. In the standard case of a woman who ants an abortion, the woman has not made any contract to give aid. She
has not engaged in an economic enterprise invol ing the
provision of services. She has not invited the formation of a
relationship with the particular fetus inside her or indeed
with any fetus at all. She has not acted in such a wa as to
discourage or deflect anyone else who could give the
required aid. She has not volunteered aid to the fetus. She
has not incurred a duty by barging into the fetus's life and
damaging the prospects it enjoyed before her intervention. In
short, none of the usual reasons for requiring aid apply.
It may seem that at least one of the standard reasons does
apply. It may seem that any woman ho voluntarily has sex,
even if she uses the best available contraceptive measures,
knows there is a chance she will become pregnant and may
therefore be held to have assumed the risk that she will be
required to aid a fetus.

Is not this "assumption of risk" argument essentially the
basis on which we impose a duty to aid on innkeepers, for
example? The innkeeper wants healthy guests , not sick ones.
as the woman wants to have sex but not to get pregnant.
But the innkeeper runs the risk of receiving a sick guest and
suffering added responsibility, as the woman runs the risk
of getting pregnant and being made to carry the fetus to
term.
There are a number of points to be made here. The
"assumption of risk" argument provides no basis at all for
forbidding abortion in pregnancies resulting from rape. More
broadly, it is not the general tendency of our law to hold
people responsible for all the risks they can possibly foresee,
however small. Strict liability has a place in our law but
hardly any place at present when the result would be to
impose substantial costs on individuals.
That brings us to the crucial point: there may be cases
where we are willing to say that one has a duty to aid
because he has assumed the risk, but in no other case do we
impose burdens remotely approaching the burdens of pregnancy on such a slender basis as that. We speak easily of the
innkeeper's duty to aid, but it would never occur to us to
require an innkeeper to donate a kidney, say, to a guest in
need.
It may seem that I have somehow forgotten the central
point. which is that if the fetus is regarded as a person. then
there is a person's life at stake. I have not forgotten that.
One of the lessons of my argument is precisely that to say
there is a life at stake is not to settle the issue. e have other
values besides the preservation of life. and the other values
sometimes prevail over the value of life.
There are many cases, having nothing to do with abortion,
where we allow refusals to aid even though life is at stake.
In such cases, the alue of life is outweighed, and it is outweighed by precisely the same values that support a
woman's right to choose abortion.
I turn now to the last point in my written statement. I
have argued that it is inconsistent with the general spirit of
our laws to forbid abortion. To forbid abortion is to impose
on the pregnant woman burdens of a sort we impose on
no one else.
If that is correct, then the injustice of forbidding abortion
is exacerbated b the fact that it is women who suffer.
omen as a class have suffered from much discrimination,
both private and public. We should not add new
discrimination. Further. no one chooses his or her sex. e
should be, and in general we are. particularly reluctant
to impose burdens on a class defined by a characteristic over
hich individuals have no control.
In sum, to forbid abortion is to compel \ omen to gi e aid
to other individuals at substantial cost to themselves in a
manner at odds with the general tenor of our laws. It is
wrong to impose special disadvantages on any class, and it
is especially wrong when the victims are a class such as
women.
The force of this argument cannot be avoided b saying
that we reject the general principle that one is entitled to
refuse aid and that the proposed constitutional amendments
before this subcommittee represent first steps towards a
better legal order.
First of all, even most opponents of abortion would not
reject the basic principle that one may refuse aid in cases
such as those raising the possibilit of compelled organ
donation.
Second, there is no evidence at all that the mo ement to
forbid abortion is the first step in a mo ement to impo e
greater duties of aid general! .
Third, and most important. even if we were inclined to
impose greater duties of aid, starting b forbidding abortion
is starting at the wrong end. The pregnant woman ha done
much less to invite the imposition of a dut to aid than
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man oth r on horn we urrentl_ impos no duti s at all.
Th burd n that
would impo e on her are va tl more
objectionable than an
e impo e in other conte ts.
I think it i al o appropriate to remind the ubcommittee
at this point that, although I ha e been assuming the fetus
ma be tr ated as a per on the status of the fetus is highl
contra ersial. and that controversy further argues against
starting with a prohibition on abortion. Even if w are
inclined to make enormous changes in the areas of law I
ha e discu sed-and I do not belie e we are-prohibiting
abortion i not the wa to tart.

Editors No te : After te tifying on the inadvisability of any
con titutional amendment prohibiting abortion, Professor
Regan went on to comment on each of the proposals that
were before the subcommittee. One of them, the Hatch proposal , has since been voted out of subcommittee and
approved by the full Senate Judiciary Committee. It no will
go to the Senate floor. It will have to be approved there and
in the House by a two-thirds majority, as well as be ratified
b three-quarters of the states to become part of the
Consti tu ti on .
The portion of Professor Regan s testimony which concerns
this specific proposal and responses by Senator Hatch are
given here. The wording of the proposed amendment, S.]. Res.
110, is: "A right to abortion is not secured by this Constitution. The C'Jngress and the several States shall have the
concurrent power to restrict and prohibit abortions: Provided,
That the law of a State which is more restrictive than a law of
Congress shall govern."
Mr. Regan: The Hatch proposal represents an unprecedented invitation to Congress to enter areas of family law
and ordinary criminal law. Our whole history presupposes
that Congress should leave these areas alone. If we must act,
then what we should do is simply return the matter to the
States. I am interested to note that that is how Senator Hatch
describes his proposal , although the proposal as written
does a bit more.
Senator Hatch: Actually , that is not correct . It does absolute! nothing . All it does is give the option. I might
mention, and it is speculation on my part, ... that the likely
congressional action would probably be to do away with
federal funding of abortions. But there will certainly be an
effort b those who are anti-abortion to enact a very stringent federal law, as there will always be by those on the
other side as well to not have a stringent law.
Mr. Regan: I am not denying that, Senator, but I believe you
have characterized your amendment as essentially doing
nothing but reversing Roe v . Wade and putting the matter
back under State jurisdiction.
Senator Hatch: No. I make it very clear that the Congress
can act on this matter.
Mr. Regan: What I mean is that I believe in your original
statement-the statement you read us earlier this morningyou characterized your proposal that way and you now
agree with me that you do in fact create a brand new
congressional power under your proposal.
Senator Hatch: No. We create what existed previously, prior
to Roe and Doe . Frankly , I do not find that a very difficult
position to be in . I do not mean to interrupt you , but I just
want to correct that one point.
We have filed a new Criminal Code. It is going to be
passed out of the committee within the next week or so.
That Code opens up all kinds of areas that heretofore have
not been considered , and we codified certain areas which
have. There is nothing in the law that says Congress has no
right to do that or should not have the right to do it. It
32

comes do n to a question of philosophy wh th r ongr ss
should or should not have th right to pass string nt or nonstringent abortion laws.
11 m am ndment does, in my opinion, should it b
passed b two-thirds of th
ongr ss and b ratifi d by
three-quart r of th tat s, is provid th opportunity for
the people, through el ct d r pr sentatives, to det rmine the
outcome of this parti ular issue.
I might add that whether or not congressional authority
e isted with respect to abortions prior to Roe is the r al
question . I think it did.
Be that as it ma , our stat ment has b n very provo alive toda . and I ha e enjo d it. in spite of the fact that you
have differed with me. which I find just awful. That is supposed to be humorous.
Mr. Regan: Despite your comments, I continue to beli ve
that your proposal creates a new form of federal jurisdiction
to prohibit and restrict abortion. Conceivably it existed pr viously but that would have been regarded as extreme}
doubtful b most constitutional scholars. It certainly represents a kind of legislation which Congress has by and large
avoided, I believe.
To make a related but more technical point, this would be
an almost unprecedented creation of a situation in which
Congress has a power to legislate but not a supreme power.
Ordinaril , of course, federal law is made controlling b
the supremacy clause. You have suggested creating a
congre sional po er and specifically stipulating that it shall
not be supreme.
Senator Hatch: You are probably right also, although not
necessarily so . that that power may not have existed prior to
Roe v. Wade . I have to acknowledge that. On the other hand,
this is a very innovative country.
Mr. Regan: Indeed it is, but there is always a question of
whether in entions are a good thing.
Senator Hatch: And occasionally we Senators can be fairly
innovative , but most inventions are certainly worthy of
debate.
Mr. Regan: That is a matter on which we could have a long
discussion, which I ill attempt not to begin.
I have two more very specific points. The stipulation in
the Hatch proposal that the more restrictive of two laws, one
state and one federal, shall control is likely to produce
severe problems about deciding which of two laws is in fact
more restrictive. I think the most difficult problems, which
may be the least immediately obvious, will arise when states
and Congress prescribe different procedures, either different
medical procedures for an ab rti n everybody agrees is permitted, or different procedures for deciding whether a
specific abortion is permitted under the relevant law. Again,
I think that these particular problems are problems that no
one really wants to create.
Finally, I cannot help suggesting that one defect of the
Hatch proposal, to my mind, is that it would allow states
and Congress to forbid abortions even when a woman's life
is at stake. I hope that no state or Congress would do that,
but one of the advantages of other proposals is that they
at least suggest that would not be a good idea.
Senator Hatch: If I could interrupt you on that, I cannot
conceive of anybody doing that.
Mr. Regan: I am glad to hear that , Senator. Thank you .
Senator Hatch: Let me ask another question about.the
amendment I have offered. I have argued that one of its
virtues is that it allows these very difficult issues relating to
abortion to be resolved by legislative consensus rather than
by solutions imposed upon everyone kicking and screaming
by the Supreme Court itself.
I have been criticized , however, for leaving a question of

basic individual rights up to a democratic vote, something
that is generally inconsistent with the Constitution. In
return, I have suggested that S.J. Res. 110 is nevertheless an
appropriate constitutional solution because of the deep division over what precisely these individual rights in fact arethe rights of a pregnant woman or rights of the unborn
child.
Could you offer some comments on this whole issue of
leaving an issue such as abortion to a democratic representative process rather than to unelected jurors?
Mr. Regan: The claim that the Supreme Court Justices went
beyond their judicial role in Roe v . Wade is, I think, simply
mistaken. It has always been an essential part of the Court's
role to interpret the Constitution and to protect individual
rights. That means sometimes making controversial decisions about what individual rights are. We do not say, and
we have never said, that every question should be left to
ordinary legislative processes.
The fact of the matter is that Roe has been a controversial
decision and has made lots of changes in state laws. I do not
think, on the whole, that it made greater incursions on state
laws than, say, Brown v. Board of Education or than, say,
Reynolds v. Sims, and I could go on. We have never said
that all questions should be left to the ordinary political
processes. In particular, questions about rights should not.
You are absolutely right that the claim can be made that
there are rights on both sides of this issue. The same could
be said , for example about the issue of race discrimination.
It was claimed in favor of those who wanted to discriminate
that there were rights of association. There are usually ways
to find rights on both sides.
The mere fact that this is a controversial question about
which there is great division in our nation , which nobody
can fail to see, is not by itself an argument for giving it back
to the states or taking it away from the Court. The Court
has made decisions, decisions that almost everybody would
now approve of, on many highly divisive issues , as divisive
as abortion.
The real question, which we should not try to a oid , is,
given that the Court was operating within their role, were
they right? I think they were.

Donald Regan
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